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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing interest in the construction and implementation
of sharing rules for environments with externalities. Such environments encompass a large
array of economic scenarios and arise whenever the benefits or costs to a group of agents
depend on the coalitions formed by agents outside the group. Prominent examples are
a market with several competing firms, countries negotiating on trade agreements and
union-firm bargaining in a given industry.
One fruitful approach has been to proceed axiomatically and propose sharing methods
(known as values) based on a collection of desirable properties. Some of the proposals
extend the Shapley axioms (Shapley, 1953a), which are stated for games with no external-
ities. This is the direction taken in the papers by Myerson (1977), Bolger (1989), Feldman
(1996), Albizuri, Arin and Rubio (2005), Pham Do and Norde (2007), and Macho-Stadler,
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2007) (that we will refer to as  ). These proposals
satisfy the properties (axioms) of eﬃciency, anonymity (symmetry), linearity, and the
“null” player property that states that players which have no eﬀect on the outcome should
neither receive nor pay anything. The particular definitions of these properties, at times
together with some additional axioms, lead to diﬀerent extensions of the Shapley value.1
In  we strengthen the symmetry property by proposing the “strong symmetry
axiom” capturing the idea that players with identical influence should receive the same
outcome. We show that this axiom is equivalent to adopting an “average approach”,
which generates an attractive family of sharing methods (see Section 2).
In games without externalities, another useful approach to find sharing methods has
been to take a constructive point of view. Harsanyi (1959) used the notion of dividends ac-
cruing to a player from the various coalitions he could participate in and showed that their
sum yields the Shapley value. Maschler (1982) generalized this approach to a procedure
through which the payoﬀs accruing to agents are still given by the Shapley value.
1de Clippel and Serrano (2008), rather than extend the Shapley axioms, focus on the implications of
the marginality underlying the Shapley value, for games with externalities. McQuillin (2009) characterizes
a value that simultaneously extends the Shapley value to games with externalities and situations where
there is a prior coalition structure. Dutta, Ehlers and Kar (2008) adopt the potential approach to study
and provide values for games with externalities.
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In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values. We show
that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends.
Furthermore, we show that this approach is flexible and can be easily adopted to generate
non-symmetric values. Hence we provide a new family of weighted Shapley values for
games with externalities and show that each one coincides with the weighted Shapley
value of the average game.
2 The environment and the average approach
Cooperative environments with externalities are best described as games in partition
function form (Thrall and Lucas, 1963). We denote by  = {1  } the set of players.
An embedded coalition is a pair (  ), where  ⊆  is a coalition and  3  is a
partition of  . An embedded coalition specifies the coalition as well as the organization
of the rest of players. Also, we denote by P the set of all partitions of  and by  =
{(  ) |  ∈   ∈ P} the set of embedded coalitions.
Let ( ) be a game in partition function form, where the characteristic function
 : → R associates a real number with each embedded coalition. For each (  ) ∈
, we interpret (  ) as the worth of coalition  when the players are organized
according to the partition  The partition  is always taken to include the empty set ∅
and the characteristic function satisfies (∅  ) = 0.
A sharing method, or a value, is a mapping  which associates with every game ( )
a vector in R that satisfies
P
∈ ( ) = ( {}). A value determines the payoﬀs
for every player in the game and, by definition, it is always eﬃcient since we assume that
forming the grand coalition is the most eﬃcient way of organizing the society.
To introduce the family of values proposed in  using the average approach we
present first the axioms that characterize it.
We say that player  ∈  is a null player in the game ( ) if (  ) = (0  0) for
every (  ) ∈  and for any embedded coalition (0  0) that can be obtained from
(  ) by changing the aﬃliation of player .
The addition of two games ( ) and ( 0) is defined as the game ( + 0) where
( + 0)(  ) ≡ (  ) + 0(  ) for all (  ) ∈ . Similarly, given the game
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( ) and the scalar  ∈ R the game () is defined by ()(  ) ≡ (  ) for all
(  ) ∈ .
For any permutation  of  the  permutation of the game ( ), denoted by ( )
is defined by ()(  ) ≡ (  ) for all (  ) ∈ 
The extension of Shapley (1953b)’s basic axioms proposed in  for values in
environments with externalities are:
1. Linearity: A value  satisfies the linearity axiom if:
11 For any two games ( ) and ( 0) (  + 0) = ( ) + ( 0).
12 For any game ( ) and any scalar  ∈ R () = ( ).
2. Symmetry: A value  satisfies the symmetry axiom if for any permutation  of  ,
() = ( ).
3. Null player : A value  satisfies the null player axiom if for any player  which is a
null player in the game ( ) ( ) = 0.
In games with no externalities where the worth of any coalition  does not depend
on the organization of the other players, i.e., (  ) = (  0) for every  ⊆  and
(  ) (  0) ∈ , these three basic axioms characterize a unique value (Shapley,
1953b). For expositional clarity, we denote by (b) a game with no externalities, whereb : 2 → R is a function that gives the worth of each coalition. The Shapley value  can
be written as:
(b) =X
⊆
( )b() for all  ∈  , (1)
where we have denoted by ( ) the following numbers:
( ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(||−1)!(−||)!
! for all  ⊆  if  ∈ 
− ||!(−||−1)!! for all  ⊆  if  ∈ \
In games with externalities, the previous axioms are satisfied by a large set of values.
In  we propose an extension of the notion of symmetry also to the externalities
created. The strong symmetry axiom strengthens the symmetry axiom by requiring that
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exchanging the names of the players inducing the same externality should also not af-
fect the payoﬀ of any player. To formally state the axiom, we denote by  , with
 3 , a new partition with  ∈  resulting from a permutation of the set \.
Given an embedded coalition (  ), the  permutation of the game ( ) denoted by
() is defined by ()(  ) = (  ), ()(  ) = (  ), and
()() = () for all () ∈ \ {(  ) (  )} 
2’. A value  satisfies the strong symmetry axiom if:
201 for any permutation  of  , () = ( )
202 for any (  ) ∈  and for any permutation  , ( ) = ( ).
As proven in , any value  satisfying linearity and null player axioms also satis-
fies the strong symmetry axiom if and only if it can be constructed through the “average
approach”. This approach consists of, first constructing an average game (b) asso-
ciated with ( ), by assigning to each coalition  ⊆  the average worth b() ≡P
3∈P (  )(  ) with
P
3∈P (  ) = 1We refer to (  ) as the “coeﬃ-
cient” of the partition  in the computation of the value of coalition  ∈  . Second, the
average approach constructs a value  for the partition function game ( ) by taking
the Shapley value of the game with no externalities (b) Therefore, if a value  is
obtained through the average approach then, for all  ∈  ,
( ) =
X
⊆
( )b() = X
( )∈
(  )( )(  ) (2)
There are still a variety of values satisfying the requirements of linearity, strong
symmetry, and null player, each value corresponding to a diﬀerent averaging method.
In  we add a “similar influence axiom” to characterize a value with coeﬃcients
(  ) =

∈\
(| |−1)!
(−||)! (Feldman, 1996, also proposed but did not axiomatize this value)
Other recent proposals also satisfy the average approach. The externality-free value stud-
ied and characterized by Pham Do and Norde (2007) and de Clippel and Serrano (2008)
corresponds to the vector of coeﬃcients (  ) = 1 if  =
n
 {}∈\
o
and (  ) = 0
otherwise; that is, only the partition where players outside  form singleton coalitions is
taken into account. On the other extreme, in his extension of the Shapley value McQuillin
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(2009) ends up proposing a value that corresponds to (  ) = 1 if  = {\} and
(  ) = 0 otherwise; that is, the only important partition is the one where players
outside  form a single coalition. Finally, the proposal by Albizuri et al. (2005) corre-
sponds to the Shapley value associated with the simple average: (  ) = 1 () where
 () = |{()() ∈ }|.2
We denote by  the value constructed through the average approach with a vector
of coeﬃcients . The analysis developed in the next section can be applied to any value
, in particular to those previously discussed.
3 Dividends and weighted values in games with ex-
ternalities
In games with no externalities, the Shapley value can be characterized as the value that
distributes the Harsanyi dividends of the game equally among the players in the cor-
responding coalitions. Harsanyi (1959) assumed that every coalition would negotiate a
vector of “dividends” such that the sum of all coalitions’ dividends vectors would be a
feasible allocation for the grand coalition. Therefore, the dividends of a coalition  are
what is left after all proper subcoalitions of  have received their corresponding dividends.
More formally, the dividends ∆() of a game in characteristic form (b) are defined
recursively: ∆(∅) = 0 and ∆() = b() −P(∆() if  6= ∅. Harsanyi (1959)
showed that all the equal shares of the dividends a player is entitled to, sum up to his
Shapley value:
(b) =X
3
1
||∆() for all  ∈ 
In a similar spirit, consider a game with externalities ( ) and a system of coeﬃcients
. We can obtain the dividends of a coalition  when it is part of the partition  taking
into account that the dividends of subcoalitions of  should matter only in proportion to
2The values proposed by Myerson (1977) and Bolger (1989) can not be constructed through the average
approach. Some of the values proposed by Dutta, Ehlers and Kar (2008) can also be constructed through
the average approach while others can not.
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its corresponding coeﬃcients. Formally, we define the dividends inductively as follows:
∆ (∅  ) = 0
∆ (  ) = (  )−
X
()∈
(
()∆ () if  6= ∅
Proposition 1 provides an interpretation of any value  in terms of dividends. There-
fore, it is a result that can be applied, in particular, to the values studied by Feldman
(1996) and  (2007); Albizuri et al. (2005); Pham Do and Norde (2007) and de
Clippel and Serrano (2008); and McQuillin (2009).
Proposition 1 The value  can be written as follows:
 ( ) =
X
( )∈
3
1
||(  )∆
 (  )
Proof. We denote by ∆() the dividends of the average game (b) associated
with the ( ). We prove by induction over the number of elements of  that
∆() =
X
3∈P
(  )∆ (  )
The proof is immediate when  = ∅ (and it is also immediate when || = 1). Assuming
that the expression holds for any coalition  with ||  ||, we can write
X
3∈P
(  )∆ (  ) =
X
3∈P
(  )
⎡
⎢⎢⎣(  )−
X
()∈
(
()∆ ()
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
=
X
3∈P
(  )(  )−X
3∈P
(  )X
(
∆() = b()−X
(
∆() = ∆()
Since  is the Shapley value of the (characteristic form game) b we can write ( )
in terms of sum of dividends:
(b) =X
3
1
||∆()
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therefore,
 ( ) = (b) =X
3
1
||
X
3∈P
(  )∆ (  ) =
X
( )∈
3
1
||(  )∆
 (  )
Maschler (1982) showed that the sharing method based on dividends was a special case
of a procedure where a sequence of coalitions sequentially claim their worth. At each step
the worth of one coalition is equally shared by its members. The process then generates
a new game where the worth of each coalition containing the sharing coalition is reduced
by the worth of the sharing coalition, whereas the worth of other coalitions is not altered.
The next coalition in the sequence then proceeds to share its worth. This process ends
when all coalitions arrive at zero worth. It was shown that this process must end, and the
sum of payoﬀs accruing to each player is his Shapley value. The value  can be arrived
at via these more general procedures as well if the proportion (  ) of the dividend
associated with each embedded coalition (  ) is assigned to each player  ∈  and the
coeﬃcient (  ) is also used to reduce the worth of each coalition containing .
We can use the dividends we have constructed to derive a family of weighted values for
games with externalities, similarly to the Shapley (1953b) construction for games without
externalities. We define, for a given vector of weights  ∈ R with   0 for  ∈  (and
for each vector of coeﬃcients ) a weighted Shapley value for games with externalities:
 ( ) =
X
( )∈
3

(  )∆
 (  )
Note that we keep the symmetric treatment of externalities (since the coeﬃcients (  )
are anonymous) while allowing for diﬀerent bargaining powers when sharing the dividends.
It follows easily that there is a relationship between the weighted Shapley value for
games with externalities that we have defined through the dividends and the weighted
Shapley value of the corresponding average game ( b). We state this result in the next
proposition:
Proposition 2 The value  can be written as follows:
 ( ) =  ( b)
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Proof. We write the value :
 (b) =X
⊆3

∆() =
X
⊆3


X
3∈P
(  )∆ (  )
following the proof of Proposition 1 Therefore,
 (b) =X
⊆3
X
3∈P

(  )∆
 (  ) =
X
( )∈
3

(  )∆
 (  ) =  ( )
Finally, we note that the value ( ) can be implemented via bidding mechanisms
in the same spirit as the ones that appear in Macho-Stadler et al. (2006), for any system
of non-negative coeﬃcients, i.e., (  ) ≥ 0 for all (  ) ∈ , as it is shown in
Macho-Stadler et al. (2008).
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